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THE END OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATION
MONOPOLY: SUBSEQUENT
RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER CHOICE
AMONG LONG DISTANCE CARRIERS
James F. Snyder
Paul T. Nelson
Cachenne C. Morris

Introduction
It was called the "Modified Final Judgement," (US vs ATT) and its impact was so great that the initials" MFJ" were as familiar as one's own name
to anyone in the telecommunicatiom industry. The l\1FJ was actually a federal consent decree ordered by U.S. District Court Judge Harold Greene on
January I, 1984. Under this order, the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company (AT&T) agreed to divest itself of its local telephone business. As
far as the telecommunications industry was concerned, MFJ left AT&T with
only its long distance business.
However, it was the other pan of Judge Green's order which resulted in
the end of the monopoly which AT&T had enjoyed in the long distance business. To insure thi~ result, the local telephone companies, such as Southern
Bell, were ordered to provide "equal access" to the emerging competitors
of AT&T. Even before this decision (I 969), the monopoly had slowly begun
to crumble when the Federal Communications Commission~ (FCC) granted
a new company, Microwave Communications Incorporated (MCI), permission to initiate long distance telephone service between Chicago and St. Louis.
Now, with Judge Greene's order, the monopoly was over.
Background
So far as the re idential telephone service is concerned, AT&T faces two
basic kinds of long distance competitors. First, there arc those who actually
own and operate their own long distance microwa\e, satellite, or fiberoptic
cable networks. The best known of these are, of course, MCI and USSprint,
but there are several hundred others. Some of these are private networks like
those operated by railroads and oil companies to support their own operations. The others tend to be regional in scope and sell directly to customers
in their own region, or wholesale their service to others.
The second category of competitor to AT&T is called a "reseller." Most
resellers neither own nor operate any pan of a long distance network . Instead , as the name implies, the reseller buys in quantity at a low price from
a long distance network carrier and sells small amoun ts of that quantity,
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usually in minutes of service, at a higher price but one that is at least competitive with the other long distance providers in the market. Most of the
resellers are small mdependent entrepreneurs who serve a small , highly localized market. However, those regional network operators who offer full nationwide or worldwide service are actually resellers whenever one of their
customer's calls must be earned to a pan of the count ry they cannot reach
on their own network. In fact, \\hen they were first getting established, both
MCI and USSprint were primarily resellers themselves, and they were primarily resellers of the AT&T network. However, as MCI and USSprint have been
completing their O\\ n fiberop11c networks and a the regional network operators have been consolidating their positions. the independent resellers have
been disappearing.
In spite of the gro\\ing compe1111on, un11l the order to pro\ide "equal acce s," any long distance telephone call would automatically be routed over
the AT&f network unless the caller had previously contracted with one of
the mo kinds of competitors described above. In simple terms, this contract
amounted to establishing an account with an "alternate carrier" to be able
to use its service. Once the account wa~ establi hed, the customer would be
given a five-d1g11 "access code number" \\hich had to be dialed before dialing the long distance area code number.
Because the alternate earners did not enJoy the same acce to the customer that AT&T enJoyed, the court ordered the local telephone companies
("telcos") to make the phy~ical changes necessary in their equipment to give
each qualified long distance sen1ce pro\ider the ,ame access to the customer
as that enJoyed b, <\T&:T 1-urthermore, the local telco was ordered to mail
"ballots" to each of their local telephone ervice subscribers that would allow them to "elect" the long distance earner of their choice. Finally, tt wa
ordered that an~ ,ubscnbcr \\ ho failed to make a choice would be assigned
randomly 10 one of the qualified carriers on a pro rata basis of those electing a earner
The monopoly \\as finall, dead. Once a sub criber had made a choice by
completing a ballot, or once he she had been asMgned because of failure to
make a choice, an> long distance call made from a ubscriber's telephone
required that the per,on dial only the digit "one" plus the area code plus
the telephone number, and the call would be routed by the elected or assigned earner and priced according 10 that earner's pricing chedule.
aturc of the 8u5incss at the Time of the Break-up
Telephone service, mcluding long distance service, had for so long been
considered a natural monopoly, lil-.e electrictty, gas, water, and sewer ser~ice. ow, long distance service was suddenly thrust into a fiercely compelltive free market. A brief picture of the business at this time eems appropriate
to the situation and 10 the research at hand.
First of all, it is BIG! Curren t eMimates in the trade press put annual
revenues in the U.S. long distance market at well in exec s of $50 billion!
{Busines Week, 1989). Furthermore, it is growing at a tremendou rate. A
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Federal Communication Commission study in October, I 987, reported that
"the total number of interstate switched acces minutes handled by all long
distance carriers has grown steadily since mid- 1984 at an annual rate of 13%"
(FCC ews, 1987).
In the residential sector, in addition to population growth, there has certainly been a lifestyle change in the use of the long distance call. In our parents' day, the only time one called long distance was \\hen someone had died.
Now with a much more mobile society and two-income families, the luxury
of instant communication is no longer a luxury. Thb change, however, has
been going on for quite some time. The maJor change smce 1984 is the significant price reduction in long distance calling. According to Bu~incss Weck,
AT&T has cut long distance price~ 40 percent ince 1984 (Business Weck,
1989).
Price cuts promise to be much more evere m the high \Olume business/government markets. No longer is Cliff Robertson suggeMing that the
consumer may be assigned to one of those other earners if he she does not
ballot for AT&T. 0\I all of the Big Three are devot1ng the maJority of their
promotional efforts toward the commercial sector. ot only will greater price
elasticit y encourage more usage, it will bring on e\en more rapidly the long
di tance exchange of data: EDI, the ne" frontier of electronic data interchange!
Before Judge Green's order, when it was all one company, AT&T used
the profits from ns long distance business to subs1d11e Hs local service. It
,,as a very profitable business then. In the future, matnly as a result of the
advent of fiberoptlc cable, the cost of long distance service will drop dramaticall}. In 1985, the ",,hole ale" price (tech111call} the price for a DS-3)
\\as m the range of $1.20 - $ I .40 per mile. o,, a large \O[ume user can expect a quote in the vicintly of $0.15 per mile!
From the consumer's point of vie,,, all of the good new\ about price have
a significant do1,nside. Local sen ice ,,tll eventuall; be a measured service.
A consumer will be charged for the use of the telephone by the mmute. This
is not ne1,. Since 1901, it has been the standard for e1, York City. Even
though consumer groups have been successful m fightmg it m some areas,
once 11e get used to putting our personal computers "on lme" for large parts
of the day, it is easy to envision measured service as the only eq uitable option. Wh} should it be different from water, electricit y, or gas sen ice?
The Resulting Struggle for Market

hare

Once equal access became a realit 1 , the st ruggle for market share was on,
and for AT&T the ta k was that of trying to hold on for dear life. In 1984,
ll was es11mated that AT&T held an 88.80/o share of total industry revenues,
with MCI at 5.70/o and USSprint at 3.70/o. (Bear team Telecommunications
Tabloid , 1987). The most recent estimate shows AT&T at a greatly reduced
68%, MCI with 12070, and USSprint at 3.70/o (Business Week, 1989).
One percentage point of market share is worth over $500 million! It was
not su rprising that AT&T was willing to spend hundred of millions of dollars in the Cliff Robertson campaign in 1985.
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These simple market share figures, however, obscure some of the complexity of the market. For example, in the consumer market, which is the
focus of this research, market share is generally measured in terms of number of customers. This is a reasonable approach since the average Jong distance telephone bill fo r the re~idential customer is low and the variance is
small. Furthermore, practically all consumers use only one long distance
carrier-the one they elected. Therefore, it is much easier, and probably much
more accurate, to count customers than it is 10 try 10 estimate a share of
residential expenditures on long distance calling.
The situation in the commercial market is much more complex. First, the
average long distance telephone bill I quite high and the variance is tremendous. Second, u~ing more than one long distance carrier is becoming more
the rule than the exception. Telecommunications managers used to say "you
can't get fired for u\ing AT&T." O\\ n is quite likely he or she will get
fired if it is onl} AT&T. Becau~c of these 1wo factors, the only sensible measure of commercial marl-.et share has to be as a percentage of total revenues.
Unfortunately, 11 i \Cr} difficult 10 e 11mate commercial revenues since even
the estimates of the ~pl it between commercial and residential vary considerably. 1 e\ertheless, there appears ht1le doubt that the commercial market
is much greater than the re idcntial marl-.et and It\\ ill no doubt become even
larger.
T he Consumer's Dilemma
The folio\, ing ballot wa\ rccei, cd b) a con umer m Charleston, South
Carolina.
Southern Bell Equal Acee~~ Ballot

Plea\t u,c one of chc t\,o op11on h,cet.l to lk 1• natc tht Ion• d1,1an ...c 1.:ompan) (or ,ompamc,) that )OU "hh to
pro,.,1de your long d,,1.101.:e ,c-r" 1c.:l' tor the telephone number (or number)) a\~CX1a1ed Mth the
ma b1ll1n n mbc ,ho,\ n aboH·

O PTIO

II 288-A'I &'I

ll 488-ITT

II 852-LI EO 1'
II 826-TEL/M A

ONE

11 222-MCI or fl American E\prcss
1J 777-GTE PR! T

\1 "\ PL O ')8881

OPTION TWO

Plca,e a,1r.1gn ea ... h tc:lcphone nurnbl'r h,h:d belo,, to the ,omran) mJ1~ated an the ,pace follo"mg the number
(lndacate )lllH i.;hOKC b~ u,1ng the thrce-d1g1t 1.:odc for that ,ompan))

000

000

000

000

000

Signature___________ Date_ _ / _ _; _ _
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What was the consumer to do? The accompanying information certainly
did not offer much guidance or in formation other than a brief description
of the choices and a telephone number to call for further information.
In terms of the product, from a technical point of view there was certainly
no difference. Regardless of which choice the consumer made, some o r all
of the calls would still go over the AT&T network. In fact, since many of
the local telcos continued to do the long distance billing just as they always
had, it was hard to realize that any change had been made at all.
Indeed, it would be fair to say that most consumers consider any telephone
call to be a commodity-that a telephone call on one company's network
is just like any other. In fact, quality of voice transmission is very difficult
to measure, but there is no doubt that fiberoptic cable is superior to all other
media. However, when USSprint was making so much of hearing a pin drop
because of its fiber, much of its traffic was still going over a digital microwave network. And, even after its ads about blowing up its own microwave
towers, USSprint was still routing some of 11s traffic over at least one other
microwave network. It is \ery doubtful that ANY customer ever 1,,.ne\~ if a
call was being routed over a fiberoptic cable or not.
Strictly speaking, the only actual difference bet ween AT&T and all of the
other choices available on the ballot was that AT&T would cost more. So,
why did 6007o of the respondents still vote for AT&T? There seemed to be
three basic reasons for their decisions. These same three reasons seem to explain why AT&T still holds the lion's share of the residential long distance
market:
I. The consumer 1s confused. He/ she does not see why a brand loyalty
for something he/ she still views as a commodity should be developed.
2. The consumer is reluctant to change. The system has been working so
well. Why change? It was the best ystem in the world, bar none. "Ma
Bell" was a part of Americana; why did they do this to her?
3. Perhaps most importantly of all, the consumer who has stayed with
AT&T probably does not see the price difference as significant enough
to warrant the perceived risk of making a change.
The Research Projects
Objective . Initial Research
The research reported here was conducted from a consumer marketing perspective. This was a highly unusual event in which the consumer was suddenly faced with the requirement that a one-time purchase decision be made
on a service previously accepted as a natural monopoly. Quite simply, the
objective of the research was to determine how the consumer decided and
why.
Since the conversion to equal access required physical changes at each of
the telephone "exchange" offices, several years were required to complete
the majority of the changeovers. The use of the term "exchange" is not technically correct (in telco terminology "NXX CO DE"), but to the layperson
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the first three d1g1ts of the local telephone number describe his/ her " exchange," like the " P E-6" in Glenn Miller's famous "Pennsylvania 6-5000."
The use o f the word "exchange" here will refer to the three-digit prefix of
a local telepho ne number.
Mcthodolog)
In the met ropolitan area of Charleston, South Carolina, which is served
by Southern Bell, the maJority of the exchanges had been converted 10 equal
access by the lauer part ot 1985. O ne year later , in ovember and December
of 1986, 565 telephone ,un ey, \\ ere conducted b> College of Charleston tu
dent<,. The study ,,as not ,ponsored or fu nded by any outside person or or
ganization .

Un11I that 11me. onl1, cursory report, of the "balloung" had appeared, the
researchers were anxious to learn what had happened . Lnfortunatel). befo re the results of the research could be published, several highl> n~,pected
sources published their O\\n nattonal emmate, (Bu iness Weck , 1986). These
reports seemed 10 pre empt the \ alue of' ' local'' results due 10 11s similarity.
and this earlier research wa, put on the hclf for t\\O years
Rc,ult, - \l a rkct , hare
The marl.ct share data I rom the 1986 suney, the re,ult, of" hich are sho" n
in Table I , were dem ed b} asking the follO\\ mg questions·
I . " I las your hou,ehold rcce1,ed a ballot a,l..mg you 10 choose a long
d1,1ance ,en ice?" ( \ "no" an\\,cr disqualified the respondent.)
2 " Ha"e you c.hosen a long d1,1am.:e enu:c?" (A "no•· answer wa\
recorded as

O C H O ICC )

3. " \\ hKh company did you choose?"

T\\O corollar} que,tio1l', \\ere a,ked in the 19 6 sune} to tr) to determine
the reasons for consumer ch01ce, . fhc first quc,11on "a
" \\ hat i, ) our a\ er age long di,tam:e bill for one month?"
The hvpo1hes1s here wa, that tho,e with higher long distance bilb "ould
elect one ot the alternate earner, "hil.h h,1d 10,\ er rates. Table 2 ,110\\s a
compamon of long d1,tance rate, published b} the f elecommu111cation,
Research & .\Cllon Center, \\ a,hington. DC. in October, 1986.
The results of our suncy were:
Average 8111
$29. 12
Those using A f &1
40.6Those using alterna te carrier
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While this would certainly seem 10 support the hypothesis, a study done
at Texas A&M University for AT&T in 1986 came to the conclusion that:
Residential customers eem 10 value "quality" more than "price" and
are somewhat resistant to change. AT&T's market share [in Texas]
among customers who base their choice of a long distance company
on price is only 23.8 percent. AT&T has 80.8 percent of the market
among residential customers who base their choice on quality. (Texas
A&M)

Thi perception of quality must have been related 10 the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOC's) and their local 1elcos rather than AT&T since
most of AT&T's circuit were still analog at 1ha1 time, and they had practically no fiberoptic cable. Also, as pointed out earlier, much of the alternate
carriers' traffic was still being carried by AT&T so there really was no basis
for a comparison of quality to be made except 10 the detriment of AT&T.
Table I
Markel Share
1986 un c)

AT&T
MCI
GTE SPR I T (2)
LI EO E (3)
TEL MA (4)
ITT
0 CHOICE"

..

Original
Respon\e
pct.
n
347
61.6
39
6.9
1.4
8
64
11.4
5
0.9
0.5
3
97
17.2
563

100.0

--

of
..Allocation
o Choice"
(I)
72

8
2
13

97

Markel hare
With Allocation
pct.
n
74.4
419
47
8.3
10
1.2
77
13.7
I. I
6
4
0.7
563

100.0

--

(I)

It is a5sumed that Southern Bell, the local telco, randomly allocated
the "no choice" respondents on a pro raca basis according 10 the
MFJ and FCC orders.

(2)

Became USSprint.

(3&4)

LineOne was a regional interexchange carrier (IXC) operating it O\\ n
network and Tel/ Man was a regional reseller. Both have ince been
merged into Telecom*USA.
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Table 2
Long Distance Rates
Rates Per Minute
3000 Mile
I 00 Miles

D E

D E

AT&T 1st minute
additional minutes

.43 .26 . 18
.28 . 16 .12

.55 .33 .24
.36 .21 . 15

MC I Isl minute
additional minutes

.35 . 19 .13
.28 . 17 . 12

.46 .30 .21
.36 .21 . 16

USSprint Isl minute
additional minutes

.34 . 18 .12
.28 . 17 . 12

.45 .29 .20
.36 .21 .16

D = day, E = evening,
night and \\eekend
These rate applied to inter Late calls only
The second que 110n asked \\ as:
"Are you auempting to learn more about your options?"
The responses to question two are shown in Table 3.
In summary, those \\ho spend more on long distance are more likely to
use an alternate carrier; and, AT&T user do not really care what has happened to long di5tance service, and they are atisfied "ith the existing service.
Interim Period
During those t\\0 years, the issue wa not forgouen. Ho,, could it be?
Anyone ,vatching television sa" a barrage of high-powered adverti ing by
Table 3
Responses to Question 2
"Are ) ou attempting to learn more about your options'?"

YES

0

AT&T users

92

276

Alternate carrier users

37

79

No Choice user

26

38

155

393

TOTAL
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long distance telephone service companies. Logically, the new research question became: Has market share changed? Some national publications were
reporting a further drop in AT&T's share while other5 were even showing
a resurgence for AT&T (Public Utility Commission of Tcxa,, 1989). And,
perhap~ even more importantly, had there been any brand switching? The
earlier research results provided a very good data base upon \\hich to pursue
these questions.
Objective and Methodolog)' • Follo~~-up Rc\earch
During several weeks in December, 1988, the same 565 original respondents were called to see if they had switched earners. l\lso, a ne\\ random
sample of 210 Charleston area customer, was surveyed by telephone to see
if the o,·erall market share had changed rmall~, the comumcrs in both samples were asked whether they were aware of the fact that selecting one company did not preclude the use of other companies at the same time. Results
of the research follO\\.

1988 Result, from Original ample
In the follO\\·UP study done at the end of 1988, as indicated m Table 4,
the ne,, (210) random sample of the res1den11al Charleston metropolitan area
\\as done 10 see 1f there had been a change m market share.
Table 4
Market Share
'\

Percentage

Market hare

163

77.6

\IC!

19

9.0

USSpnnt

10

4.7

Telccom•US.\

18

8.9

41.0

lOO..O

AT&T

TOTAL

AT&l 's share of the sample was about three po111ts above the sample of
1986 \!Cl had gamed only slightly. USSprint had gained 3.5 points. The

combinallon of LineOne and Tel man as Telecom*USA had lost almost six
points, and ITT had dropped out.
As sho,\n m Table 5, a re,1e,, of five different summaries of market share
over the past few years provides another perspective.
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Table 5
Summaries of Market Share
BW
12-22-86
(1)

AT&T

MCI

USSPRI T
OTHERS

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

82.0
8.0
3.0
7.0

8 Strns Economist WSJ
02-27-87 10-17-87 05-12-89
(2)
(3)
(4)
84.4
75.0
76.85
8.3
10.0
9.78
5.0
5.0
6.64
2.3
10.0
6.73

BW
07-31-89
(5)

68.0
12.0
8.0
12.0

Business Week, December 22, 1986, p. 52.
Bear teams Telecommunications Tabloid. February 27, 1987, p. 37
The Fconomist, October 17, 1987, p. 13.
Wall trcct Journal, \ta~ 12, 1989, p. 9.
Business Week, July 31, 1989, p. 82.

The e data are aggregate data including both residential and commercial
markets. Nevertheless, the, do reflect a declining share for AT&T and increasing share, for \lCI, LSSpnnt, and for the smaller niche players such
as Telecom*USA and Allnet with about one share point each (Wall trcel
Journal, 1989). All have been focused almost "holl} on the lucrative commercial market \\ hilc ignoring the residential market.
The Charleston data \\Ould ,cem to indicate that the res1dent1al market
remained static through 1988. If anything. AT&T appears 10 have regained
some of 11s lost market. The rc,1dcn11al customer 1s really a "captive" of
the local 1elco since a long distance carrier cannot offer him any value added
senices. As the memor; or old "\1a Bell" fades, and as price differences
are eroded, the residential service \\Ill become more of a commodity. Thi
leads 10 the conclusion 1ha1 the "adver11sing share model" \\ 111 be the best
predictor of residen11al market share. In other \\Ords, a company's market
share will be directly related to the proportion of 11s ad\'ert1sing e--.penditure
to 1ha1 of the industry total. E\en ii the residential long distance market is
as low as 1007o of the total market, this would be over $5 billion! In a high
fixed cost industr} such as this one, competitors can afford to spend more
advertising dolla1 for each point of market share! As competitor turn their
a11en11on 10 the residential market, one \\OUld e--.pect that the AT&:T hare
will continue to erode.
Result'> - Brand "itching
While the summary data from the J988 survey indicated both a switch back
to AT&T as well as a shift in shares among the alternate carriers, the research
directed specifically toward brand switching was much le s conclusive. Of
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the 563 respondents to the 1986 survey, 276 (49%) were successfully contacted in the 1988 follow-up.
Only 5 of the 276 (1.8%) in the intervening two years had switched from
AT&T lO an alternate carrier:
MCI

I

MCI

2

USSprint
3
Telecom*USA
At the same time, 11 of the 276 (3.99%) who had been using an alternate
carrier in 1986 had switched back to AT&T from:
USSprint
4
Telecom*USA
5
These data support the conclusion that AT&T has regained some of its
market share since there has been more brand switching to AT&T than there
has been away from it. However, it must be acknowledged that these numbers are quite small and, in a marketing sense, there has been very little brand
switching in total! Cuswmers just DO OT seem to be inclined to try out
a new brand (only 5 were so inclined!) when no advertising or incentive is
directed toward them.
Results • A Second Source of Supply

The hypothesis here was that it was almost totally unknown lO the voters
when they selected their long distance carriers that even if they selected MCI,
for example, that they would still be able to use AT&T, or for that matter,
USSprint. If the voter had established an account with MCI, all he/ she needed
lO do was to dial "one plus" the area code and number, and MCI would
complete the call for him and bill him. Actually, in most cases, the local telco bills the long distance charges along with all the local charges. However,
all that same voter need do to make a call on the AT&T system is to dial
"I 0288" then "I + area code + number" and AT&T will ca rry the call
and bill him. Or, he/ she can do the same thing by dialing "I 0333" to call
on USSprint, or if he/ she is not an MCI customer, he/ she can u e its network by first dialing "10222."
This, in fact, gives the consumer several sources of supply. No longer is
the customer captive to a single long distance company. For most residential
customers, this is probably not going to be a big feature. However, if the
customer's primary carrier's cable is cut (still a com mon occurrence) or, if
for some reason the system goes down, the use of an alternate source of supply could come in very handy. On very busy days, like Mother's Day (the
busiest), some carriers have more capacity on some routes than other carriers have. Again, this could be advantageous to know. How many do?
The following questions were asked of the I988 control group:
I.

"Do you know that you can use other carriers
than the one you selected?"
50

YES

NO

53.00Jo

47 .60Jo

2.

-

-

6. I OJo

" Do you know hO\\ to do it?"

93.00Jo

The first quesuon was probably interpreted to mean: "can you change carriers?" which of course you can; and, it also carries a bias in that respondents do not want to appear not to know. It is suspected that the "YES"
response is grossly overstated smce, when pressed to explain how to do it,
"equal access" consumers still did not seem to understand that the} have
alternate suppliers-that they arc not locked into only one long distance
company.
Rc<,ult'> - Pricing on Long Distance Carrier~
To 1Hap-up this proJcct, one of l he researcher tested the choices available m order to compare charge, . On the C\Cntng of August 7, 1989, between
7:35 P. \I and 7 47 P . '.'.I.. tour 1..alb of c,actl} two (2:00) mmu1es in length
were made from a residence m \It. Pleasant, South Carolina, to another
res1denual number m St L 0U1', ~tis oun ince the researcher's long distance earner at the time 11as Southcrn"Jet, the other three call were made
on AT&T, MCI. and L SSprint as described above (e.i., 10288, 10222, and
10333). The result, arc ,ho11 n m Table 6
I able.' 6
Comparable Rate,

Southern Net ( I + \rca Code +
Billing date Sep 7 • 1989

umber)

Charge
S0.32

Federal
Ta,
so 01

Total
S0.33

AT&.T (102 · +1+ \ rca Code + ,umber)

OJ:!

0.01

0.33

t\lCI (10222 + I + \rea Code + ~umber)
Billing date. Oct ~. 19i9

0.31

0.01

0.32

0.31

0.01

OJ~

Billing date: ,\ug ~. 19, 9

USSpnm (10333 + I + \rea Code
Billing date: Oct. 7, 19 ·9

+ 'lumber)

While not of ,1arthng magmtude, both MC I and US print were approxi110
mately 31T'o 101\er than the other two ,en1ces. The} ,,ere abo billed 1
II
II
months later, 11 hcreas the AT&T call wa, earned on 1hc bill h1ch as daled the AME day (same evening) the call 11a made. All four bills were mcluded with the "regular" monthl} Southern Bell 1elephone bill.
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Conclusions
With such a grand name as "Modified Final Judgeme nt ," the federal consent decree on J anuary I , 1984, does not seem to have had an equally grand
impact on the consumers of long distance telephone service. There can be
no denial that the event wa an economic milestone-it is not every day that
a monopoly industry become, an oligopoly.
The industry players did their part to put thmg~ mto motion, but the consumers just did not seem to take part. The consumers behaved in a manner
more consistent with their life-long experiences-telephone service is a
"given" and always will be. Telecommunication companies, o n the other
hand, kne,, the number of dollars at stake and have approached the battle
for market share with great vigor.
The results of the attempt on the part of competing companies to gam
market share does not seem to have been fruitful in the past fe,\ years m
the Charleston area-or other areas as reported above. Using a data base
generated in 1986, shortly after the e,ent, an update ,,a, attempted to see
if people were switching, market ,hare changing, or usmg a\'ailable choices.
The results of that study showed consumer, have mO\ed little m either direction to a different carrier originall> or to different carriers after making a
ne,v choice and experiencing the sen ice of that choice. As to the kno,,ledge
a consumer has concerning a\'ailable choices after making a choice of long
distance carrier, it does not seem to be commonly kno,vn among consumers.
To date, this is probabl> the best kept secret m telecommunications Certaml> not one of the earners has promoted 11. Perhaps the risk of bad debts
has re ulted m an unusual allegiance of silence among fierce competitors.
Whatever the reason, 11 ,,ould seem the public has not been full y informed.
Will there be change in the near future? This seems to depend on ho,\ man}
advert1,mg dollars MC I and USSprmt are going to be able to muster for the
battle.

A Post~cript
-\s a postscript 10 this research and the prepara11on of 1l11s article, it seems
appropriate to note that at the end of I989, all three ervices-AT&T , MC I,
and USSprint -launched heav> television ad\'ert1smg campaigns aimed at
the residential user. These campaigns seem to have continued thro ugh 1990
unabated. Will the steady-state solu11on be a one-third share for each? Probabl> not. As yet, unborn technology ,,ill probably be the key to that answer
... a lo ng with the already burgeornng reality of electronic data interchange
(EDI). The result ,, ill most sure!} be that the com mercial industrial governmental segment of the long distance telecommunications market will become
the dominant one. However, the residential long distance market \\hich is
nO\v estimated to be $24 billion will continue to be a major battleground
(U.S. cws and World Report , 1990).
Finally, 11 1s estimated that this $50 billion-a-year industry will continue
to grow "at least 10 percent a year in the 1990's." The same source esti52
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mates AT&T's I 990 share of that market at 64 010 (U. . ews and World
Report , 1990). The market continue, to gro\\ at an amazing pace and AT&T's
share continues to erode.
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